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Clearing the Airwaves for Access
by Michael Botein

While the courts and the government grapple with
the concepts and consequences of access, activist
citizens press broadcasters to open the airwaves.
In the resulting legal tangle, the effective means
of securing access are essentially extralegal,
whilE:) the legal means are essentially ineffective.

I N THE LAST FEW years there has emerged a new
desire on the part of individuals to participate in government and its decision-making process. This desire is
variously termed "new populism," "community control,"
"participatory democracy." Covering all shades of the
political spectrum, its causes are unclear to psychologists,
sociologists, and political scientists-as well as to lawyers. Nevertheless, more and more people are demanding a louder "say."
Sooner or l&ter the trend had to reach broadcasting,
simply because radio and television provide the best
forum for making a "say" heard. In fact, the new activism in broadcasting is surprising only because it anived
later, not sooner. In the past disgruntled citizens were
able to use radio and television indirectly, through coverage of their demonstrations, meetings, and demands.
But now their acquiescence in broadcasting's version of
their "say" has diminished. Dissident groups do not
want interpretative reporting but direct access to the
broadcast media.
As an academic concept, an enforceable right of access has been around for some time. Indeed, it represents only a logical extension of the First Amendment.
The syllogism is simple: the goal of the First Amendment is an informed public; groups must have access in
order to inform the public; therefore, the First Amendment requires access. The late Prof. Zechariah Chafee
considered the question carefully in his report to the
Hutchins commission, Government and Mass Communications (1947). And in 1967 Prof. Jerome A. Barron
picked access up, dusted it off, and posited it as a new
First Amendment right in his article, "Access to the
Press-A New First Amendm~nt Right," in 80 Har-
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vard Law Review 1641. The fly in Professor Barron's
ointment, however, is that he fails to propose means of
implementation.
The obstade to access is broadcasting's technological
and economic structure. Technology restrict'> a broadcaster to one channel; economics forces him to maximize
that channel's appeal. Advertisers pay for the number
of warm viewing bodies rendered unto them; broadcasters, in seeking the largest possible audience, cater to the
lowest common denominator. Time gained for access is
advertising revenue lost to broadcasters, and the loss is
compounded if access programming motivates viewers
to switch channels. As a result, broadcasters cannot
afford access.
Despite these deterrents, disgruntled citizens have developed effective, albeit nondoctrinal dcvices for gaining
access. They have challenged license renewals in order
to obtain leverage over stations; they have forced an expansion of the fairness doctrine; and they have begun to
develop some bases for constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights of paid access.
License Challenges Are Not Total Reform

Challenges to license renewals attract the most public
attention because they produce dramatic results. Most
challengers do not expect to knock a station off the air,
of course, and probably would be aghast if they succeeded. Instead, they use renewal challenges to gain
leverage. In negotiating their way out of challenges,
many stations have promised more jobs and programs
for minorities. A group of challengers recently withdrew
its opposition to a multi station sale only after the principals had committed more than a million dollars to
minority training and programming. And not so long ago
the Federal Communications Commission felt constrained to warn a station that its promise to clear minorityoriented programming with a local citizens' group might
violate its statutory responsibilities.
A strikingly small group of hardy and dedicated souls
has pioneered renewal challenges. Their work has paralleled the general upsurge in civil rights and public interest
law. When Everett Parker, head of the United Church of
Christ's Office of Communication, helped some Mississippi viewers challenge the renewal of WLBT-TV, Jackson,
he started a ground swell of renewal challenges.' The
commission held that WLBT-TV's viewers had no
standing, a position for which it was resoundingly rebuked by then Judge Burger in Office of COl11l11unica-
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tion oj United Church of Christ v. F.e.C., 359 F. 2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). When the commission went on
to renew the license, Judge Burger displayed some fine
judicial wrath and revoked the station's license on the
spot (425 F. 2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
. The commission has been less than receptive to
license renewal challenges. Until 1969 it never refused
to renew a license except for violations of its engineering and disclosure requirements. In dissenting from the
WLBT-TV renewal, two commissioners commented that
"the only way in which members of the public can prevent renewal of an unworthy station's license is to steal
the document from the wall of the station's studio in the
dead of the night."
At the end of 1969 an understrength commission did
vote three to one not to renew the license of WHDH-TV,
a Boston station. Broadcasters immediately ran for shelter to Capitol HilI, and under legislative pressure the commission, with a new chairman, issued its Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C. 2d 424 (1970),
which required challengers to show as a precondition that
a station had not rendered "substantial service." In what
has become an all too familiar scenario, however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made a last-minute entrance, and in an opinion
by Judge J. Skelly Wright held that the policy statement
violated the Communications Act's "public interest"
standard. Citizens Communications Center v. F.e.c.,
447 F. 2d 120 I (1971). The end of the story is not
yet written. The commission is giving the F.C.C. opinion
lip service but little else. Broadcasters are seeking new
legislation.
The commission's approach may be right but for the
wrong reasons. Although renewal challenges produce
short-term gains for challengers, they may create longterm dangers. Challenges are essentially ad hoc. While
they may bring a few stations at a time into line, they
do little to reform the industry. More important, the
challengers represent their own interest, not the "public
interest"-vague as that concept may be. A settlement
may win well-deserved rights for a minority, but a truly
just decision must consider the majority, which, after
all, is just a group of minorities. The commission has
refrained from judging the quality of a station's programming, partly because of a lack of evaluative criteria
and partly because of its concept of the First Amendment. But when these judgments need to be made-and
indeed are being made daily-they should come from a
body that is representative of the public's many different
interests.
Fairness Doctrine Is Less Than Reliable
In theory, the fairness doctriile is simple and equitable. It provides only that broadcasters whose facilities
are used to present one point of view on a controversial
issue must provide reply time to representatives of the
opposing view. In Red Lion Broadcasting Company v.

F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme Court held
the doctrine, as well as the "personal attack" and "political editorial" regulatiohs promulgated under it, constitutional. Fairness is different from and broader than
the equal-time provisions for elections in Section 315 (a)
of the Communications Act.
In practice, the fairness doctrine has proved to be an
administrative nightmare. Like any essen,tially natural
law theory, it cannot be easily quantified or containeda condition the commission has aggravated by failing to
define adequately "point of view," "controversial issue,"
or "reply time." As a result, the doctrine is in a continuous state of flux.
Fairness's most important development is its recent
extension to advertising. The current confusion began
with WCBS-TV; 8 F.C.C. 2d 381 (1967), affirmed as
Banzhaf v. F.e.C., 405 F. 2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. i968),
in which the commission ruled that fairness required
time to reply to cigarette commercials. The commission
pointedly restricted the principle of the case to the federal government's legislative and administrative involvement with smoking. Nevertheless, this supposedly airtight ruling inevitably began to flow through to
advertising for other product~. The culmination came in
Friends of the Earth v. F.C.C., 449 F. 2d 1] 64 (D.c.
Cir. 1971), which held that commercials for high-powered cars and high-octane gasoline were as much within
the fairness doctrine as commercials for cigarettes. The
court reasoned that federal environmental legislation
made pollution as controversial an issue as smoking and
that the advertisements implied that automotive exhausts
were socially beneficial. It then followed its time-honored custom of dumping the issue of prescribing adequate
reply time back into the commission's lap.
Friends of the Earth makes fine environmental but not
administrative sense. First, it leaves the definition of a
"controversial issue" even vaguer. Automotive exhaust
pollution may be a major public concern in New York
City, but not in Bisbee, Arizona. In fact, using that
case's logic, the commission recently ruled that a United
Fund campaign was controversial in a particular community because many local citizens preferred other charities. Second, commercials often lack a readily identifiable point of view. One for gasoline may emphasize low
price, another the desirability of use. Finally, in order
to determine the adequacy of reply time the commission
must engage in what one F.C.C. official has termed
"counting the minutes." Indeed, shortly before deciding
Friends of the Earth, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that military recruitment commercials did not require reply time, as "the undesirable features of military
life have been displayed in virtually every living room
in the country, frequently in living (or dying) color."
Green v. F.C.C., 447 F. 2d 323, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The parameters of Friends of the Earth are hazy. For
example, one advertising executive recently posited a
reply by the "Anti-Forest-Fire-Prevention-League." It
was: "Don't believe that stupid bear. A little forest fire
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can be fun. Help Keep America Brown. Jingle: Only
You Can Start a Forest Fire."
The fairness doctrine is conceptually sound. Without
it, broadcasters would be free to operate the "propaganda stations" that the early Federal Radio Commission
worked so hard to suppress. Nevertheless, fairness's current status does little to promote broad access. The present confusion makes it a less than reliable legal tool.
More important, fairness provides only a conditional
right of access, since its requirement of reply time can
be triggered only by a broadcaster's discretionary decision to air one side of a controversy. Often broadcasters avoid giving reply time simply by airing nothing
controversial.
Paid Access? Its Glitter Requires Gold
Renewal challenges and the fairness doctrine provide
free time, which is understandably attractive to lowbudget citizen groups. Free time for all groups is not
justified, however, and amounts to a low-visibility subsidy. Each group should receive time according to its
needs and pay according to its means. The courts, the
Congress, and the F.C.C. have been increasingly willing
to recognize a right of paid access.
The most important step towards implementation of
a First Amendment right of paid access came through
the efforts of a group of antiwar businessmen and the
Democratic National Committee. Although they differed in ideology, they shared a common grievance: both
had been unable to buy television time to present their
views. In another ground-breaking decision by Judgc
Wright, the District of Columbia Circuit came to their
rescue by holding' that a "flat ban on editorial advertising" violated the First Amendment. Business Executives
Move for Vietnam Peace v. F.e.c., 450 F. 2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Although the case is superficially attractive,
the result is ambiguous and the court's reasoning circuitous.
The court did not hold that individuals havc a right
of paid access but rather that a station's "flat ban on
editorial advertising" was unconstitutional-a vague
posilion that creates difficulties. The court applied its
holding only to time "relinquished by broadcasters to
others." This overneat distinction might require stations
to sell only commercials, not entire segments-a rather
artificial result, since buying an entire program and
buying a program's advertising time are pragmatically
the same. Moreover, the "relinquishment" theory fails
to specify when, if ever, a buyer is entitled to an entire
program, since broadcasters sell time on both bases.
The court also held that broadcasters were still free to
exercise "reasonable regulation of the placement of advertisements" and merely instructed the commission to
develop "reasonable procedures." The commission has
taken this as a license to distinguish the case to death,
either by denying requests for time outright or by invoking the "relinquishment" theory.
In reaching the result of Business Executives, Judge
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Wright refused to take the easy road of statutory construction but met the constitutional issues head-on. He
reasoned that a broadcaster's intimate~perhaps even
incestuous-involvement with the federal government
constituted state action. He was following a "state aid"
or "state acquiescence" approach similar to that used in
the white primary and segregated facilities cases. He
then took on the more difficult task of elevating access
to the level of a First Amendment right, drawing heavily
on Red Lion. But while the Supreme Court in that case
did make some vague sounds about access, it was concerned mainly with listeners' rather than speakers'
rights.
The District of Columbia Circuit actually may have
been more interested in discouraging civil disobedience
than in interpreting the First Amendment It spoke approvingly of the plaintiffs' desire to pay for air time and
noted that they did not usc "newsworthy acts, such as
engaging in civil disobedience or organizing mass demonstrations." On the one hand, the court may have been
attempting to heed the warning of Martin Luther King,
Jr., that "a riot is the language of the unheard." On the
other hand, it may have been saying simply that money
is the American way. In any event, its result is strikingly
similar to the "Whitehead doctrine" announced by the
director of the executive branch's Office of Telecommunications Policy, Clay Whitehead, which would do away
with fairness and substitute an ill-defined right of paid
access.
Business Executives is thus lovely to look at but impossible to live with. Access has First Amendment aspccts, but a fifty-year-old industry cannot be restructured by judicial fiat.
What Time Can Candidates Buy?

The high cost of running for elective office has
prompted many attempts at reform. In 1970 Congress
passed the Political Broadcast Act (S. 3637), only to
see it vetoed by President Nixon. By 1971, however, the
reform movement was strong enough to bring about the
Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (Public Law
92-225), which took effect on April 7, 1972. Title I of
that act, the Campaign Communications Reform Act,
imposes limitations on both expenditures by candidates
and charges by broadcasters. But, more important, Title
I amends Section 312 (a) of the Communications Act
to provide that a station's license or construction permit
may be revoked by the commission for "willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of
a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate
for federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."
The F.C.C., however, gave a narrow interpretation to
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this provision in its public notice, "Use of Broadcast and
Cablecast Facilities hy Candidates for Public Office,"
which appeared in 37 Federal Register 5796. It construed the words "access" and "purchase" in the disjunctive, allowing a station to buy its way out of selling
time through donating token free time. It explicitly provided that candidates have no right to purchase a whole
program, as opposed to a commercial on a program, and
that political organizations not supporting a particular
candidate have no right to buy air time at all-an obvious attempt to avoid confrontation with some of the
issues raised by Business Executives. Finally, and most
important, neither the Congress nor the commission has
provided any standards as to what time period a candidate has a fight to buy. A broadcaster apparently may
offer only those he chooses, even if they happen to fall
after the late late show.
Like Business Executives, the Campaign Communication Reform Act represents a commendable aspiration.
But, like that case, it cannot be fully effective without
standards for allocating access time.
Will Cable TV Enhance Access?

The F.C.C.'s most strenuous efforts to implement access have focused on cable television, which does not
have commercial television's technological and economic
limitations. While broadcasters can operate only one
channel, cable systems can offer many. Only 15 per
cent of existing cable systems have more than twelve
channels, but twenty and forty channel capacities are
now technologically and economically feasible. Cable
television can be free of the advertiser dominance under
which broadcasting has labored for so long. With its
huge channel capacity, cable can offer not only mass
appeal but also specialized pay television programming
from opcra to motorcycle races to minority-group
drama. Cable television can become an electronic analogue to the newspaper stand's wide range of materials.

The commission's most important moves in promoting
access to cable television came in its recent Cable T e/evision Report and Order, 37 Federal Register 325 I
(1972). The new regulations require all urban cable
systems not only to have a large capacity-a twentychatmel minimum-but also to build in the capability
for two-way communications betwecn subscribers and
the system. The rules also provide that cable system,.;
must maintain free "public access," "education access,"
and "local government access" channels and must lease
all unused channel capacity on a "first-come nondiscrimimitory" basis. This will guarantee citizens groups
at least one forum, and independent producers a potential audience for pay television.
Although a better attempt at setting access standards
than either Business Executives or the election expenditure reform act, the new rules do not resolve conflicts
between competing applicants-for example, requests
for the same time period from a small community housing group and the N.A.A.C.P. If the demand for access
exceeds the supply of channels-a long-term and still
questionable proposition-the regulations will prove inadequate. Creating standards to allocate access timc is a
frustrating and perhaps impossible task, as pointed out
in my article "Access to Cable Television" in 57 Cornell
Law Review 419 (1972). Nevertheless, without standards, access remains an attractive but academic concept.
Look Outside the law for Access

Whether a movement, a trend, or mcrcly a fad, access
has won the public's heart and cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, too much enthusiasm and too little analysis
have attended the concept of access. The effective means
of securing access are essentially extralegal, while the
legal means of securing access are essentially ineffective.
Only hard study and a willingness to experiment by
broadcasters, citizens groups, and governmental bodies
can make access a reality.

Lawyers Included in 1972 Census of Selected Services
AW FIRMS and individual lawyers
L· engaged
in private practice are

among the different persons and business firms that will take part in the
1972 census of selected services conducted by the Bureau of the Census.
The 1972 census is the latest in a
series of business censuscs commenced
in 1929 and now conducted every five
years covering the years ending in "2"
and "7."
Questionnaircs will be mailed by the
Censm Bureau in early January, 1973.
Firms operating more than one place
of business will receive a separate form
for each location. Completion of the
questionnaires is required under federal
law (Title 13, U.S. Code). All answers
on census questionnaires are confiden-

tial a.nd are used only to prepare
statistical summaries for the various
business classifications and for different
geographic areas.
While the due date for the return of
the completed questionnaires is February ] 5, 1973, Census Bureau officials.
request that forms be returned earlier,
if possible, in order to reduce the peak
processing load and to speed publication of census results.
Individual lawyers or law firms engaged in private practice will use Census Form CB-S1.
Questions in the 1972 census of
selected services are similar to those
asked in the census tbat covered operations during 1967. Questionnaires ask
the location of the business, dollar

volume of receipts. first quarter and
annual payroll, and number of employees in 1972. In addition to these
basic questions, there will be other
inquiries that will apply only to the
kind of business category in which
the establishment is classified.
This census is the major source of
detailed information concerning ser·
vices in the United States. Publications
containing these statistics will be available for purchase at nominal cost in
late 1973 and 1974. Copies of the reports will be available for reference at
all Department of Commerce field
offices, which are located in principal
cities throughout the United States, and
will be available at major'· public and
college libraries.
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